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Introduction 
Turnout vs. Persuasion 
 Following Donald Trump’s unprecedented upset victory in the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
election, political strategists, pundits, and pollsters alike confronted the same confounding 
question: How did we get it all wrong?  After all, Trump defied every principle of ‘good 
politics,’ and yet he managed to achieve the largest electoral college victory for a Republican 
candidate since George H.W. Bush in 1988.  What’s more, the Republican nominee rejected the 
findings of his own party’s national committee, which, just three years earlier, had insisted that 
future nominees broaden the coalition and reach out to minorities and young voters.  Instead, 
Trump relied almost entirely on an appeal to his right-wing base, composed largely of older, 
white voters.  Even more surprising, he earned the support of approximately 7.5 million voters 
who supported former President Obama in the 2008 and 2012 elections. (Sides et. al, 2018)1   
 In response, the Democratic Party confronted the failure not only of its Presidential 
candidate, but of its general election strategy.  Despite the progressive elements of the party 
platform, Secretary Clinton primarily focused on a persuasion strategy, which involved targeting 
of undecided voters, moderate Republicans dissatisfied with their party’s candidate, and 
conservative Democrats who were concerned about Mrs. Clinton’s background.  While the 
campaign engaged in a turnout effort, the principal messaging/policy proposals relied on a 
center-left, moderate approach, including a pledge for comprehensive immigration reform, 
modest tax increases on the super-rich, and improvements to the Affordable Care Act. (Cohn, 
 
1 Sides, John, Tesler, Michael, Vavrek, Lynn. (2018). Identity Crisis. London: Princeton 
University Press: 177. 
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2019)2  In many ways, the Clinton team’s political strategy resembled that of previous 
Democratic Presidential candidates in the mold of Barack Obama and Bill Clinton. As the 2020 
general election approaches, pollsters and strategists, especially those affiliated with the 
Democratic Party, have yet to reach a consensus as to the optimal election strategy.  
 As it currently stands, there are two primary schools of thought about the Democratic 
election strategy among political scientists and strategists, both of which are often framed as 
mutually exclusive.  According to one theory, the Democratic candidate/campaign should 
prioritize persuasion and target undecided voters to garner their support.  While proponents of 
this strategy acknowledge the danger of taking Democratic votes for granted, they believe, 
especially in the swing states, that an appeal to these voters will ultimately win the day. Policies 
such as the expansion of the Affordable Care Act and modest income tax increases on the 
wealthy are examples of policies that are often designed to garner support among undecided 
voters.  The alternate theory relies instead on mobilizing/energizing the racially and culturally 
diverse, progressive base of the party.  Policies such as Medicare-For-All, the Green New Deal, 
and the wealth tax can be considered proposals that largely appeal to the Democratic Party’s 
liberal base.  Proponents of this view insist that low turnout, especially in the African American 
community, is a function of Democratic carelessness and an insistence that the support of these 
voters is guaranteed, and therefore does not need to be earned.    
 I wanted to find a thesis topic that allowed me to merge my passion for American 
politics with prognostication.  I also wanted to explore a project that was relevant to current 
 
2 Cohn, Nate. (2019). “A Sliver of the Electorate Could Decide 2020. Here’s What These Voters 
Want.” The New York Times. 
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events, and therefore could be adjusted in the moment.  With that in mind, I decided to conduct 
research that would shed light on the following questions:  
(1) Should the Democratic nominee prioritize turnout of his/her own base, or focus 
instead on persuading undecided/moderate Republican voters?   
(2) Since question 1 assumes mutual exclusivity, is there a way to reconcile the two 
general election strategies without compromising policies?  
(3) If the optimal election strategy involves some combination of turnout and persuasion, 
which issues should be more prominent, and why? 
 
Although, as the old political adage tells us, elections have consequences, the 2020 
presidential election holds special significance in an era of vastly expanding executive power. 
Following the lead of FDR, recent Presidents have sought to broaden their authority by creating 
new federal bureaucracies, circumventing the legislative branch via executive order, and 
politicizing the judiciary.(Hall, 2018)3  Congressional dysfunction, combined with a decrease in 
judicial intervention,  has accelerated this trend such that Presidents have felt more comfortable 
taking unilateral, sweeping action.   The next Commander in Chief will have the power to 
inflame/deescalate an international trade war, reshape the judiciary for the next quarter-century, 
and approve unilateral military action. 
The election results will also have profound implications for the long-term viability of the 
respective political strategies.  If an established, relatively centrist candidate, like former Vice 
President Biden, wins the nomination and goes on to defeat President Trump, the persuasion 
strategy and the conventional wisdom may be revived.  Conversely, if a progressive candidate 
 
3 Hall, Andrew, B., Thompson, Daniel, M. (2018). “Who Punishes Extreme Nominees? 
Candidate Ideology and Turning Out the Base in U.S. Elections.” American Political Science 
Review: 7. 
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such as Senator Sanders is victorious in the general election, the persuasion strategy may be 
rejected for future campaigns.      
In part one of my thesis, I will conduct a political and economic analysis of the 
persuasion strategy, which will entail a literature review and a presentation of the 
theories/arguments in support of it.  Economic theories of games, public choice, and the median 
voter will inform the analysis.  The Median Voter Theorem, developed in the 1950s, has been 
applied in the political arena by numerous Democratic candidates, including Bill Clinton, Al 
Gore, and Hillary Clinton, with varying degrees of success. When combined with game theory, 
which also involves strategy optimization, the economic analysis becomes more comprehensive.  
Solutions to this game will include considerations of the relative probabilities of each strategy 
and the likelihood that Trump implements his dominant strategy, which has and continues to be, 
an appeal to his most loyal supporters.     
In part two, I will examine the base strategy again through the lens of Politics and 
Economics.   Although there is little historical evidence of an effective base strategy, at least in 
Presidential elections, I will nonetheless present the strongest arguments in its favor.  The 
economic analysis will involve a discussion of public choice theory, because it serves as a 
counterpoint to the median voter theorem.  According to this theory, voting is irrational because 
the two major candidates are so close ideologically that the daily life of an individual voter is 
unlikely to change, regardless of the outcome. 
Part three of my thesis will entail a reconciliation of the two diverging election strategies 
and a general messaging framework based on specific campaign issues, i.e. healthcare and 
immigration.  Although the advocates of both persuasion and base appeal often argue that the 
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two are mutually exclusive, there may be a way to employ the strategies in different contexts 
with respect to different policies.   In the end, regardless of the nominee, Democrats will face a 
stern test against a formidable incumbent President. 
Finally, I will engage in a normative overview of both political strategies, exploring the 
implications of precedent following the 2020 election.  If base appeal becomes the norm, 
undecided/centrist voters may become isolated and less influential.  Conversely, if the persuasion 
strategy is viewed as decisive in a potential Democratic victory, progressives may once again fail 
to identify with the party. 
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Part One 
The Persuasion Strategy 
 
Before engaging in an analysis of the two competing election strategies, definitions of 
key terms are in order.  Firstly, swing voters will be defined as those who are registered and do 
not express a preference for either President Trump or the future Democratic nominee as of 
November 2019. They are not to be conflated with ‘independent’ voters, the latter of whom often 
identify as undecided, but in practice tend to vote in a consistently partisan manner.(Bitecofer, 
2018)4 The primary subsets of swing voters include, but are not limited to: Obama-Trump voters, 
who cast their ballot for Obama in 2008/2012 and then for Trump in 2016(~7.5 million or ~1/8 
Obama 2012 voters), Romney-Protest voters, who supported Romney in 2012 and then backed a 
third party/write-in candidate in 2016(~2 million), and Romney-Clinton voters(2.5 million) who 
voted for Romney in 2012 and Clinton in 2016.(Brodie, 2019)5 In a joint survey conducted by 
the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Cook Political Report, just under 8 percent of registered 
voters nationwide fall into this category. 
In the context of the 2020 Democratic Primaries, the leading candidates, namely former 
Vice President Biden, Senators Sanders, Warren, and former mayor Pete Buttigieg draw support 
from a variety of competing factions within and outside of the party’s base.  Warren and 
Buttigieg, for instance, draw their support largely from college educated white voters, most of 
whom are over the age of 40.  Conversely, Sanders relies on voters between the ages of 18-35, 
 
4 Bitecofer, R. (2018). The Unprecedented 2016 Presidential Election, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan: 144-147.  
5 Brodie, M., Cook, C., Kirzinger, A., Walter, A. (2019). “Da ta Note: A Look At Swing Voters 
Leading Up To The 2020 Election” Kaiser Family Foundation. 
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many of whom do not hold a college degree.  Vice President Biden’s base is composed of older 
voters, over 35 percent of whom are African American. (Morris, 2019)6  With that said, there is 
considerable overlap between supporters of Warren and Sanders.  An overwhelming majority, 76 
percent, identify as liberal or strongly liberal, and therefore can be considered members of the 
base, including voters who support progressive policies, such as Medicare for All, but did not 
turn out for Clinton in 2016.  Among Buttigieg and Biden voters, 60 percent identify as 
‘moderate,’ and tend to prefer incremental, rather than sweeping change.  As such, 
Warren/Sanders can be considered representatives of the progressive wing of the party, and 
therefore advocates of prioritizing turnout, while Biden/Buttigieg can be considered advocates of 
the persuasion strategy.  Although it doesn’t necessarily follow that moderate candidates adopt 
the persuasion strategy, every Democratic presidential candidate since 2000 with a ‘center-left’ 
platform similar to that of Secretary Clinton has prioritized appeals to the median voter.(Morris, 
2019)7  This phenomenon is best explained by observing the personal profiles of such 
candidates, almost all of whom represent(ed) the ‘Democratic establishment,’ with strong ties to 
party leaders and a career in politics.  Since the consensus of established Democratic party 
leaders in the last 6 presidential elections has been to prioritize persuasion over base turnout, 
moderate/establishment candidates generally adhere to this philosophy. (Collingwood, 2019)8 
 
6 Morris, Elliott, G. (2019). “Would Donald Trump be President if All Americans Actually 
Voted? The Economist: 3. 
7 Morris, Elliott, G. (2019). “Would Donald Trump be President if All Americans Actually 
Voted? The Economist: 5. 
8 Collingwood, L., Reny, T. T., Valenzuela, A. (2018). “Vote Switching in the 2016 Election: 
How Racial and Immigration Attitudes, Not Economics, Explain Shifts in White Voting.” 
Forthcoming in Public Opinion Quarterly (Spring). 
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With that said, the scope of the ensuing analysis will be constrained to encompass only 
battleground/toss-up states, which are most likely to tip the balance in the Electoral College.  The 
general consensus among pollsters and political scientists is that the swing states in the 2020 
general election are as follows: Arizona, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, North 
Carolina, Florida, and New Hampshire.9 According to the KFF-Cook survey referenced earlier, 
approximately 1/6 swing state voters are undecided as of November 2019, and that fraction rises 
to 1/4 in the so-called blue wall states, including Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, and 
Pennsylvania, as displayed below in figure 1. 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ultimately, success will depend on the degree to which the disparate cohorts of voters 
can be either persuaded or energized to support the Democratic nominee come November. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Schaffner, Brian F. (2018). “Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: 
The Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism.” Political Science Quarterly. 
 
12 
 
Chapter One 
1.1 Political Analysis 
 ‘Conventional,’ ‘default,’ ‘safe,’ ‘rational’. Among pollsters, and political scientists alike 
the above descriptors are most often used to characterize the persuasion strategy.  With the 
notable exception of George McGovern’s 1972 and Donald Trump’s 2016 campaigns, the 
elusive ‘middle of the road voters’ are typically a top priority for Presidential nominees, 
irrespective of party. After all, the base of each party is often reliably partisan, and therefore it is 
only logical to direct most resources to the small sliver of truly undecided voters.  In the 2020 
election cycle, the supposed advantages of this campaign strategy are as follows: the appeal of 
feasible, incremental policy proposals, the widespread prevalence of moderate Democratic 
voters, who outnumber their progressive counterparts, and the relatively low risk of increased 
turnout among the opposing party’s base. 
As a general rule, policies that improve, rather than disrupt the status quo, garner broader 
support than policies involving systematic overhaul.  For instance, Mayor Buttigieg’s ‘Medicare 
for All Who Want it” is an example of a policy that is a significant departure from the Affordable 
Care Act, but that does not necessitate the abolishment of private health insurance.  According to 
several large-scale surveys of registered voters in the four aforementioned ‘blue wall’ or ‘rust 
belt’ states, a public option, or a phasing in of single-payer health care, enjoys 62 percent 
support.(Ghitza, 6)10 Sanders’ proposal, which, by most estimates, would carry a price tag of 
$30-40 trillion, is supported by just 40 percent of these voters, once they are told about the 
potential tax increases entailed.  Given this disparity in approval of the two policies, it would 
appear that the Democratic nominee should be cautious and adopt a more modest health care 
 
10 Ghitza, Y. (2019). “Analyzing the Catalist Voter Registration Database.” Medium (March): 6. 
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policy.  On energy, just 39 percent of voters in Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, and 
Pennsylvania approved Senator Sanders’ energy platform, which includes a ban on hydraulic 
fracturing, the primary method of producing natural gas.(Easley, 4)11 According to Amy Walter, 
national editor of the Cook Political Report, there remains a disconnect between progressive 
preferences and electability: “It goes to the heart of the debate that we’re seeing within the 
Democratic Party right now, which is the appetite among progressives and the left for an agenda 
that remains unpalatable to swing voters in the states that determine the Electoral 
College.”(Cohn, 2020)12  On the whole, although some progressive principles, such as ‘tackling 
income inequality’ and treating healthcare as a ‘right and not a privilege’, remain popular among 
undecided voters, specific policies, including those mentioned earlier, are often perceived as 
unrealistic and/or infeasible. 
Secondly, proponents of the persuasion strategy contend that, because of recent 
asymmetric polarization, radical, revolutionary policies like Medicare-for-All run the risk of 
alienating a large subset of Democratic voters.  According to recent political science research, 
asymmetric polarization is a phenomenon by which the Republican Party has moved farther to 
the right than the Democratic Party has left.  What’s more, the means of polarization between the 
two parties is also distinct, given that Republicans tend to be more homogeneous, both 
demographically and ideologically.  According to Grossman et. al, “Republicans in the electorate 
consistently express more admiration for politicians who ‘stick to their principles,’ while 
 
11 Easley, C. (2019). “The Swing Voters in 3 Key States Democrats Must Persuade in 2020.” 
Morning Consult: 4. 
12 Cohn, Nate. (2020). “Huge Turnout is Expected in 2020. But Which Party Would Benefit?” 
The New York Times. 
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Democrats favor those who ‘make compromises…’most Republicans consistently voice a desire 
for their party to become more conservative while a majority of Democrats prefer that the 
Democratic Party become more moderate.”(Grossman, 2015)13  Research from Achen et. al also 
points out the asymmetry of the two political parties: “ there is mounting evidence that the 
increasing distance between the two parties is primarily a consequence of the Republican Party's 
35-year march to the right….We should be careful not to equate the two parties' roles in 
contemporary political polarization: the data are clear that this is a Republican-led phenomenon 
where very conservative Republicans have replaced moderate Republicans and Southern 
Democrats.”(Achen, 2016)14 Data from the current election cycle confirms the strength of the 
moderate contingent, as Iowa exit polls showed that 56 percent of Democrats identify as 
‘moderate,’ while the remaining 44 percent of Democratic caucus-goers identified as ‘liberal.’  
Finally, the persuasion strategy is often preferred by Presidential campaign teams because 
it is thought to suppress base turnout from the opposing party.  As the theory generally goes, 
aligning candidate policies to match preferences of undecided voters, and therefore policies that 
are more closely aligned with members of the opposing party will prevent substantial backlash.  
As such, many strategists are hesitant to adopt a strategy that relies primarily on turning out 
one’s own base, as there is little empirical research to suggest the benefits of doing so outweigh 
the costs.  Three years ago, Hall et. al. conducted a comprehensive analysis of U.S. House 
elections, which demonstrated substantial evidence that nominees with more extreme positions 
 
13 Grossman, M. & Hopkins, D. (2015). “Ideological Republicans and Group Interest 
Democrats.” American Political Science Association (March) 13(1): 119-139. 
14Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. (2016). “Democracy for Realists.” Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
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underperformed those who adopted the persuasion strategy: “Extremist candidates do worse, 
because...they fail to galvanize their own base and instead encourage the opposing party’s base 
to turn out more, on average...we estimate that nominating an extremist instead of a moderate 
causes a party’s voters to constitute a ten percentage-point smaller turnout in the general 
election...the estimates range from −6 to −10 percentage points.”(Hall, 2018)15 Although Hall’s 
conclusions cannot necessarily predict outcomes in Presidential elections, they suggest that 
prioritizing base turnout would be a risky proposition. 
In the context of 2020, advocates for the persuasion strategy, most notably former Vice 
President Biden, contend that adopting more moderate policies and catering to swing voters is 
critical, especially in the industrial Midwest.  In an analysis conducted by Nate Cohn, a data 
scientist at the New York Times, Obama-Trump voters, who are generally seen as ‘up-for-grabs,’ 
given their mixed political voting history, accounted for approximately 70 percent of Clinton’s 
electoral defeat.(Cohn, 2019)16 This cohort makes up between 40 and 60 percent of voters who 
defected from the Democratic ticket in 2016.  In a hypothetical head-to-head match-up with 
President Trump, proponents of the persuasion strategy contend that moderation is synonymous 
with electability.   In order to assess the merit of this assertion, a case study of Wisconsin voters 
was conducted.  According to the analysis, of the approximately 238,000 Wisconsin voters who 
backed President Obama in 2012 and did not support Secretary Clinton in 2016, 209,000 
 
15 Hall, Andrew, B., Thompson, Daniel, M. (2018). “Who Punishes Extreme Nominees? 
Candidate Ideology and Turning Out the Base in U.S. Elections.” American Political Science 
Review: 7. 
 
16 Cohn, Nate. (2019). “Nonvoters Are a Source of Hope for Democrats. But Maybe a False 
Hope.” The New York Times. 
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switched to Trump.  Even when the 59,000 Romney-Clinton voters are factored in, Clinton 
suffered a net loss of 150,000 votes among voters who switched parties, which accounted for 63 
percent of all votes lost from 2012.  If she had been able to persuade just 22,748(15%) of the 
defected voters to support her, she would have surpassed Trump.  Despite her moderate agenda, 
Secretary Clinton was unable to persuade a majority of undecided swing state voters, including 
many Obama-Trump voters, to support her candidacy.  Reasons for this failure include certain 
uncontrollable factors, such as systemic sexism, but also controllable factors, including the 
emphasis on issues of identity, including immigration.  For 2020 candidates in the ‘centrist lane,’ 
the Wisconsin general election strategy will likely involve the following: 
1. Gaining back Obama-Trump vote (20 percent or +30,000),  
2. Gaining back Obama-Protest vote (10 percent or +2,800) 
3. Gaining back Obama-nonvoters (10 percent or +11,200) 
4. Losing Romney-Clinton voters (20 percent or -11,800) 
5. Losing Romney-Protest vote (50 percent or -35,000) 
6. Losing No-Show-Trump vote (100 percent or -15,000) 
7. Gaining general nonvoters (5.2 percent of registered but not likely voters (+10,300) or 
1.1 percent of eligible but not registered or likely (+10,300)) 
These estimates of support for a generic Democratic candidate with moderate policy 
positions were obtained by reviewing the American National Election Survey and Cooperative 
Congressional Election Survey databases.(Huber, 2019)17 In essence, the strategy relies largely 
on reassuring undecided voters, especially Obama-Trump voters, that they can expect a 
reasonable, moderate governing style, closer to former President Obama than Bernie Sanders.  
Despite findings from the academic literature that predict success for the persuasion strategy, its 
 
17 Huber, Gregory, A., Orr, Lilla, V. (2019). “The Policy Basis of Measured Partisan Animosity 
in the United States.” Forthcoming in American Journal of Political Science.  
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effectiveness is yet to be determined in an election against an incumbent candidate who relies 
primarily on base support. 
Chapter Two 
1.2 Economic Analysis 
 
 Having established the political upside associated with the persuasion strategy, it is 
important to consider the economic perspective.  To do so, this chapter will include an analysis 
of the Median Voter Theorem (MVT), behavioral/neoclassical game theory, and the Overton 
Window as economic mechanisms underlying the conventional political strategy. 
 Since it came to prominence in the 1950s, the Median Voter Model has served as the 
primary economic rationale for employing an election strategy that relies on appeals to the 
middle, or median voter.  According to an analysis by Hall et.al, The theorem assumes that all 
voters use the same, one-dimensional criteria for decision, which involves placing candidates on 
a spectrum, e.g. from left to right.  Secondly, the theorem assumes a turnout rate of 100 percent, 
and that voters have an incentive to support candidates that most closely align with their 
preferences.  Given these assumptions, candidates of both major parties have historically 
campaigned on platforms that are supported by a majority of voters.  In Presidential elections, 
Democratic and Republican nominees typically adopt more extreme positions to win their 
respective primaries, and then pivot to the general election by softening their partisan positions. 
(Hall, 2018)18 
 
18 Hall, Andrew, B., Thompson, Daniel, M. (2018). “Who Punishes Extreme Nominees? 
Candidate Ideology and Turning Out the Base in U.S. Elections.” American Political Science 
Review: 10-12. 
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 Although the MVT has traditionally served as the primary economic rationale for 
persuasion over turnout, recent political developments have challenged its viability.  For one, 
political scientists and economists are concerned that stickiness, or the disconnect between voter 
and candidate preferences, may undermine the relevance of MVT.  In several election cycles, 
most notably 2012, Republican voters’ views on key issues, e.g. immigration, were significantly 
out of step with those of their party nominee.  What’s more, the MVT fails to account for an 
even more prevalent form of stickiness, in which voters make their decisions based on factors 
other than policy/ideological preferences.  This phenomenon will undoubtedly play a significant 
role in the age of a President who enjoys significantly more support for many of his policies than 
his overall job performance.  According to a CNN Poll conducted in February 2020, nearly ⅔ of 
voters approve of President Trump’s handling of the economy, while just 43 percent approve of 
his overall performance. (McElwee, 2020)19   
 Given the questionable relevance of MVT in the current election, several scholars, most 
notably Dr. Andrew Hall of Stanford University, have proposed alternative economic theories in 
support of the persuasion campaign strategy.  In Hall’s utility model, voters have concave utility 
over policy positions, which means that there is a direct relationship between a candidate’s 
policy positions and voting preference.  Now imagine a typical voter in each party considering 
turning out when the Republicans nominate a moderate versus when they nominate an extremist. 
Figure 2 presents the situation graphically.   The figure considers a base voter in each party 
where voter j represents a Democrat and voter i is a Republican. Each voter is placed at his/her 
optimal point on the ideological/political spectrum.  Imagine that the Republican party nominates 
 
19 McElwee, Sean, Schaffner, Brian F. (2020). “How Democrats Can Win Back Obama-Trump 
Defectors.” The New York Times.  
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either a moderate Republican candidate (labeled on the plot as the moderate) or an extremist 
(also labeled on the plot). As shown, voter i is closer to the extremist than the moderate. 
However, voter j loses more utility than voter i gains when we consider the switch from the 
moderate to the extremist. Voter j’s utility function makes this clear because it gets steeper as we 
get further from voter j’s optimal point, and because candidates in the other party are by default 
farther away from j than they are from i, voters in the opposing party are likely to be more angry 
at an extremist nominee than the party’s own base is pleased by one. If this fear drives voter 
turnout, then extremists will galvanize voters in the opposing party more than those in their own 
party’s base.  
 In addition to the MVT and its iterations, game 
theory can also serve as a useful tool of analysis.  For 
the purposes of this paper, Presidential elections will 
be characterized as zero-sum, mixed strategy, 2-stage 
games, whereby the first and second stages represent 
the primary and general election campaigns 
respectively.  According to the rules of the game, the Democratic candidate selects a strategy 
based on President Trump’s choice to prioritize turnout, as opposed to persuasion. 
Behavioral game theory, in particular the concept of limited strategic thinking, is also 
applicable to the 2020 general election. In the 1940s, John Maynard Keynes, developed a model, 
known to economists as the ‘beauty contest,’ in which respondents select the images of people 
they think the average person deems most attractive.  As Keynes points out, participants do not 
base their decisions solely or even primarily on their own views: “It is not a case of choosing 
those [faces] that, to the best of one's judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those that 
FIGURE 2 
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average opinion genuinely...We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences 
to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be.”(Loewenstein, 2003)20  
In the context of a political competition, voters’ choices will largely rely on perceptions of other 
voters’ preferences.  Given this assumption, voters will choose the dominant strategy, or the 
strategy for which the payoff is higher than that of the alternative strategy, for any choice by 
other players’ strategy.  Even if the payoffs are unknown, voters should choose a dominant 
strategy over a dominated one.  With that said, if a voter overestimates the sophistication of other 
voters’ strategy, they will be making a suboptimal choice.  Ultimately, the goal is to be one step 
in reasoning ahead of others, but no further.   In the context of 2020, imagine a hypothetical 
scenario in which a progressive candidate, likely Senator Sanders, emerges as the Democratic 
nominee.   As a consequence of limited strategic thinking, a ‘soft’ Trump supporter, or someone 
who voted for Trump in 2016 but disapproves of his job performance, may end up voting for the 
President anyway in a general election because he/she expects Democratic voters to support 
Sanders.  Because the voter perceives Sanders as a greater threat to their views, he/she may feel 
compelled to vote in favor of Trump, especially if most Democratic voters are expected to 
support Sanders.  In other words, this soft Trump supporter is voting primarily based on the 
preferences of potential Sanders voters. 
Lastly, the persuasion strategy can also be justified by an economic concept called the 
‘Overton Window.’  According to the theory, there is a spectrum of policies representing every 
plausible position, from the most extreme to most centrist on a given issue.  In essence, the 
Overton Window represents the portion of the policy spectrum within the realm of the politically 
 
20 Loewenstein, George, O’Donohue, Ted, Rabin, Matthew. (2003). “Projection Bias In 
Predicting Future Utility.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4): 1209-1248. 
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viable, or feasible depending on the time.  Irrespective of enthusiasm, only policy proposals 
within the window will be successful.   Because politicians are limited, at least to an extent, by 
the preferences of their constituents, their success hinges on their ability to ‘bring home the 
bacon,’ or achieve tangible benefits for their district/state.  Therefore, it follows that unrealistic, 
unfeasible policy proposals are unlikely to benefit the candidate/politician supporting them.  For 
instance, while Senator Sanders’ pledge to initiate a ‘political revolution,’ by implementing 
sweeping, structural change may inspire voters, his success will ultimately be determined by 
his/her ability to implement, rather than propose, such policies.(Rabin, 1998)21  The Overton 
Window is particularly useful for discussing the perception of economic policies, i.e. tax 
increases/cuts because voters often base their assessments of a candidate’s economic policies on 
the extent to which they can be successfully implemented in a hypothetical Presidency. In the 
previous Presidential election, while a strong majority of voters approved of Clintons’ proposal 
to increase the minimum wage to $15, most did not perceive it as a feasible solution and 
therefore the issue was not a salient issue in the election. (Sides, 2018)22  This example 
highlights the importance of the Overton Window in constraining the scope of policies to include 
only those that can stand potentially enjoy Congressional support.  Campaign proposals that fall 
outside this window are often discounted by wary voters who do not expect the policy to become 
reality in the post-election world. 
 
 
 
21 Rabin, Matthew. (1998). “Psychology and Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature 36(1): 
11-46. 
 
22 Sides, John, Tesler, Michael, Vavrek, Lynn. (2018). Identity Crisis. London: Princeton 
University Press: 127-128. 
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Part Two 
The Base Strategy 
 
 As the old political adage tells us: “Republicans fall in line; Democrats fall in love.”  
While this cliché is often used by pundits and strategists to make gross generalizations about the 
voting tendencies of Democratic and Republican voters, there is at least some evidence to 
suggest that Democrats are slightly pickier about their Presidential nominees, at least relative to 
their Republican counterparts.  In the previous 11 Presidential elections without a Democratic 
incumbent at the top of the ticket, ‘established’ Democratic nominees, or those with significant 
Washington experience and the support of most party leaders, such as former Secretaries Clinton 
and Kerry, contrary to expectations, have lost.  Conversely, Democratic nominees regarded as 
relative outsiders/newcomers who energized the base and substantially increased Democratic 
turnout, such as former Presidents Carter, Clinton, and Obama, have gone on to defeat their 
Republican opponents and earn at least one term in office. 
As far as definitions are concerned, ‘the base’ signifies the progressive, staunchly liberal 
contingent of Democratic voters who hardly, if ever, support or consider supporting Republican 
candidates.  Although the term can apply to Democratic voters at large, for the purposes of this 
analysis it is more useful to focus specifically on the progressive contingent of the party who 
consistently hold Democratic positions, but do not turn out consistently.  Therefore, these voters 
are emphasized primarily by progressive candidates because they represent a younger, more 
diverse cohort aligned with the party’s views, but not always its candidates. Subsets of this group 
include but are not limited to: Obama-nonvoters, who cast their ballot for Obama in 2008 and/or 
2012 and then did not vote in 2016(4.4 million), Obama-protest voters, who supported Obama in 
2008 and/or 2012 and subsequently backed a third-party or write-in candidate in 2016(~1 
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million), registered, but not likely voters and eligible, but not registered or likely voters who 
identify with the Democratic Party.(Easley, 2019)23  These voters constitute just approximately 4 
percent of the national electorate. 
While it is virtually impossible to isolate the significance of the base strategy from these 
election results, there is at least some indication that, at least among Democrats, turnout is 
critical, and often harder to achieve, than on the Republican side.  As mentioned earlier, the 
Democratic Party consists of a diverse coalition, racially, socioeconomically, and politically.  As 
such, galvanizing support from every aspect of the base is difficult, especially in an election 
cycle as chaotic as 2020.  With that said, there are factors unique to this election that favor a 
strategy reliant on base turnout.  Unlike in previous reelection campaigns, the incumbent is 
employing a strategy almost entirely based on mobilizing voters within his party.  Therefore, the 
most critical assumption underlying the persuasion strategy is challenged because the 
Democratic opponent is him/herself prioritizing turnout over persuasion.  Even so, as Dr. Rachel 
Bitecofer points out in her book The Unprecedented 2016 Election, focusing on turnout is akin to 
“flipping giant paradigms of electoral theory upside down.”(Bitecofer, 2016)24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 Easley, C. (2019). “The Swing Voters in 3 Key States Democrats Must Persuade in 2020.” 
Morning Consult: 6. 
24 Bitecofer, Rachel. (2019).  “2018 Midterms & Mobilizing the Base.” Wason Center for Public 
Policy.   
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Chapter One 
2.1 Political Analysis 
 
‘Radical,’ ‘risky,’ ‘untested.’ Among, pollsters, pundits, and political scientists alike the 
above descriptors are most often used to characterize a strategy aimed to increase turnout, 
without much consideration of swing voters.  To this date, Donald Trump remains the only 
successful case study for the base strategy.  Trump’s eight most recent predecessors, including 
Presidents Bush and Obama, relied largely on persuasion/targeting swing voters, including the 
most sought-after voting cohort: late-deciders.  Since 2016, however, leading members of the 
Democratic Party’s progressive wing, namely Representative Ocasio-Cortez and Presidential 
candidate Bernie Sanders, have argued for a radical rethinking of national politics.  According to 
the Sanders campaign and progressive organizations like Justice Democrats, turnout of registered 
but not likely Democratic voters is alone sufficient to overcome losses among more mainstream, 
centrist voters without a partisan leaning.  The supposed advantages of base mobilization are: 
decreased reliance on the shrinking cohort of swing voters, increased turnout among the 
Democratic base, which could offset the loss of undecided voters, and increasing Democratic 
Party polarization, which increases the value of solidifying support among left-wing voters.   
This year’s election may be the first in which the Democratic candidate can afford to 
neglect swing voters.  Over the last quarter-century, the share of voters who identify as 
‘unaffiliated’ or ‘independent’ has increased, while the share of undecided voters has shrunk, 
because most people who identify themselves as Independents admit to leaning toward a party 
when they are pressed.  According to political scientist Rachel Bitecofer, “the “true” portion of 
the electorate that insists they do not align with a party is somewhere between 8% and 12% of 
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the electorate.”(Bitecofer, 2018)25 In the battleground states identified in Part One, voters 
without a preference in the 2020 Presidential election comprise approximately 15 percent of the 
electorate.  While this proportion is substantial, as far as raw numbers are concerned, registered, 
unlikely Democratic voters vastly outnumber their swing counterparts.  The Sanders campaign 
and proponents of the base strategy, including Dr. Bitecofer, argue that it is easier to energize 
unlikely voters with progressive views than it is to persuade likely, but undecided voters.  While 
this theory is yet to be tested in a national election, there is at least some supporting evidence.   
For one, Obama-Trump voters, the largest segment of presumably swing voters, have 
stongly Republican policy preferences; a majority support building a wall along the southern 
border and more than 70 percent are all but certain to support President Trump in 
2020.(Schaffner, 2018)26  Among other cohorts of undecided voters, including those who 
supported Romney in 2012 and Clinton in 2016, progressive policies, such as single-payer 
healthcare, will have little to no effect.  Political Scientists Bartel and Achen point out that over 
time, engaged citizens may construct policy preferences and ideologies that rationalize their 
choices, but those issues are seldom fundamental: “The electoral penalty for candidates taking 
extreme positions is quite modest because voters in the political center do not reliably support 
the candidates closest to them on the issues.”(Achen, 2019)27  Therefore, the Democratic 
 
25 Bitecofer, R. (2018). The Unprecedented 2016 Presidential Election, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan: 141-186. 
 
26 Schaffner, Brian F. (2018). “Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: 
The Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism.” Political Science Quarterly. 
 
27 Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. (2016). “Democracy for Realists.” Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
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candidate does not stand to gain voters in the middle by espousing moderate policies, and swing 
voters who do vote based on policy represent an extremely thin slice of the electorate. 
Having established the case against the persuasion strategy, it is important to consider the 
upsides of prioritizing turnout.  Once again, although precedent remains thin, advocates of the 
base strategy are confident given 2016 results.  In the general election, turnout in Wisconsin fell 
3 percent overall, with 6 percent of Obama 2012 voters defecting either to a third party or write-
in candidate.  Nearly 90 percent of the drop-off in turnout is attributable to Obama-nonvoters, 
many of whom who did not back Clinton in the Democratic primary.  Of the approximately 
112,000(4% of electorate) Obama voters who did not vote in 2016, Clinton would have needed 
just 22,748(20%) of them to win the state. (Gest, 146)28 
More specifically, turnout decreases had a strong racial component.  As noted earlier, the 
turnout rate in Wisconsin for the 2016 general election dropped by 3 percent, while African 
American turnout fell by nearly 20 percent.  In every battleground state excluding Ohio, declines 
in African American turnout were alone sufficient to flip the states from Democratic in 2012 to 
Republican in 2016. Nationwide black turnout dropped nearly 5 points from 2016 to 2012, which 
resulted in black voters shrinking as a percentage of the electorate, from 13 to 11.9 
percent.(Levitz, 2018)29 According to a simulation conducted by the Center for American 
Progress, which measured the impact of turnout changes by racial group in the last two elections, 
Trump would have lost Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Florida, and North Carolina if 
 
28 Gest, Justin. (2016). The New Minority: White Working-Class Politics in an Age of 
Immigration and Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press: 145-147. 
29 Levitz, Eric. (2017). “New 2016 Autopsies: It Was Obama-Trump Voters, in the Rust Belt.” 
New York Magazine.  
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African American turnout had remained constant from 2012 to 2016.  The results of this 
simulation are displayed in figures 3* and 4 below (Griffin, 2018)30: 
FIGURE 3 
Dem Margin Results      MI  WI     PA     FL NC 
Actual Margin -0.2 -0.8     -0.7    -1.2 -3.7 
2012 African American Turnout & Margin +1.3 +1 +0.4     +0.1 +0.8 
2012 Non-college White Margin +5.5 +6.5      +3.5 +0.1  -1 
2012 Latinx Margin   0 -0.6    -0.6  -0.1 -3.5 
 
FIGURE 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the largest discrepancies are observed for whites without a college education, 
turnout in the African American community would have changed the outcome of the election, all 
else being equal.    Nevertheless, demonstrating the importance of turnout is not sufficient to 
prove the superiority of the base strategy over its rival.  In order to do so, there must be an 
 
*Highlited/Bold results indicate different result with increased turnout or support from a given 
voting group 
30 Griffin, Rob, Halpin, John, Teixeira, Ruy. (2017). “Voter Trends in 2016.” Center for 
American Progress. 
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established link between advocating for progressive policies and substantial increases in 
Democratic turnout, especially among African Americans.  
 In the current political moment, there is at least some evidence that Democratic voters 
would be more receptive to progressive policies than in previous years.  According to exit polls 
from the Iowa Caucuses and New Hampshire Primary, approximately 45 percent of registered 
Democratic voters describe themselves as ‘liberal’ or ‘very liberal.’  Among voters under 30, this 
figure jumps to nearly 70 percent.(Cohn, 2020)31  Moreover, elected Democrats are beginning to 
reflect this trend towards more progressive policies; as of August 2019, 16 out of 47 Senators 
have publicly voiced their support for single-payer healthcare; just five years ago, not one 
Democratic Senator supported the proposal.  Public support for big government policies, 
including increased regulation and higher taxes, has reached the highest level on record in one of 
the most prominent aggregate surveys of American public opinion.  James Stimson, a political 
scientist at the University of North Carolina, released the findings of his annual study of U.S. 
voters.  As his findings demonstrate, “The annual estimate for 2018 is the most liberal ever 
recorded in the 68-year history of Mood...Just slightly higher than the previous high point of 
1961.” (McElwee, 2018)32 
Not only are Democratic voters shifting left, but there is a growing intolerance for more 
moderate/centrist policy positions.  According to several national polls, just ½ Sanders 
supporters, of whom 90 percent considered themselves liberal, pledged to support the eventual 
Democratic nominee.  In 2016, although Sanders voters did not defect in unusually high rates 
 
31 Cohn, Nate. (2020). “Huge Turnout is Expected in 2020. But Which Party Would Benefit?” 
The New York Times. 
32 McElwee, Sean. (2018). “How Democrats Can Mobilize Millions of Non-Voters.” The Nation.  
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nationally(compared to defection rates from losing Democratic primary candidates), defections 
occurred disproportionately in the most critical states.  As Dr. Bitecofer points out in her 
aforementioned book, the mean defection rate, or rate of third-party support, in Clinton states 
was 5.19% of the electorate, while in states that supported Sanders the mean is almost double: 
9.04%. The high levels of defection found in states that supported Sanders in the primary, 
including those that are swing states, suggest that Bernie Sanders voters were more likely to 
defect than other voters. Therefore, in Bitecofer’s words, “… Given the high levels of partisan 
polarization in the American electorate, base mobilization strategies may be more effective than 
strategies that seek to expand a party’s appeal. Although persuasion politics isn’t dead, it is on 
life support. In the polarized era, it’s all about that base.”(Bitecofer, 2018)33  Looking ahead to 
2020, another case study was conducted to test the hypothetical outcome of Sanders’ base 
strategy in Wisconsin: 
1. Gain back Obama-Trump vote (15 percent or +22,500) 
2. Gain back Obama-Protest vote (25 percent or +7,000) 
3. Gain back Obama-nonvoters (33 percent or +37,000) 
4. Lose Romney-Clinton voters (80 percent or -47,200) 
5. Lose Romney-Protest vote (50 percent or -35,000) 
6. Lose Romney-No Show vote (100 percent or -13,000) 
7. Lose No-Show-Trump vote (100 percent or -30,000) 
8. Gain General Nonvoters (26.2 percent of registered but not likely voters (+52,500) 
or 5.6 percent of eligible but not registered or likely (+52,500)) 
 As illustrated above, Sanders would have to rely not only on increases in turnout, which 
may be offset by increases in Republican turnout, but on both registered, but not likely voters(i.e. 
Obama 2008-nonvoters), and a small fraction of unregistered, unlikely, eligible voters.  
 
33 Bitecofer, R. (2018). The Unprecedented 2016 Presidential Election, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan: 141-186. 
 
30 
 
According to the Pew Research Center, unregistered, unlikely, eligible voters are 
disproportionately non-white, non-college educated, and low-income.  Roughly a third (34%) of 
nonvoters are younger than 30 and most (70%) are under 50; among likely voters, just 10% are 
younger than 30 and only 39% are under 50.   What’s more, 43% of those who are not likely to 
cast ballots this November are Hispanic, African American or other racial and ethnic minorities, 
roughly double the percentage among likely voters (22%), and just 46% have completed at least 
some postsecondary education.(Pew, 2014)34  This data indicates that eligible, but not registered 
or likely voters, even if their views are aligned with the Democratic Party platform, will be 
difficult to mobilize given their demographic makeup.  As such, a Democratic Presidential 
candidate may have to put greater emphasis on turning out members of this voting bloc. 
According to Nate Cohn, a data analyst at The New York Times, “The potential for 
Democrats is obvious. But in general, polls comparing the adult and registered voter 
populations...exaggerate the opportunity available to Democrats because they include 
noncitizens, who aren’t eligible to vote.”(Cohn, 2020)35  He goes on to say that “The major 
Democratic advantage among nonvoters, their ethnic diversity, would do little for Democrats in 
the Midwest, where the population is more white and where nonvoters are likelier to be working-
class whites who appear to view the president relatively favorably. Democrats would gain more 
in the diverse but often less competitive states.”   In the end, Sanders and other advocates of the 
 
34 “The Party of Nonvoters.” (2014). Pew Research Center. 
35 Cohn, Nate. (2020). “Huge Turnout is Expected in 2020. But Which Party Would Benefit?” 
The New York Times. 
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base strategy must rely on nontraditional voters and attempt to form a winning coalition, much as 
President Obama did in 2008. 
Chapter Two 
2.2 Economic Analysis 
 
Having established the political upside associated with the base strategy, it is important to 
consider the economic perspective.  To do so, this chapter will include an analysis of Public 
Choice theory (a counterpoint to the Median Voter Theorem), Game Theory, and the Overton 
Window as economic mechanisms underlying the conventional political strategy.  Although the 
base strategy is often perceived as risk-seeking, while the conventional persuasion strategy is 
regarded as risk-averse, in an election with unprecedented polarization, this may be a flawed 
premise. 
Unlike the Median Voter Theorem, which assumes that voting is rational, Public Choice 
Theory states that it is in the voters’ interest not to participate.  In order to illustrate this theory, 
consider a cost-benefit analysis of voting and not voting made by an individual A, for whom the 
outcome holds some significance.  On the benefit side, assume that R represents a positive 
monetary value accruing to the voter after a favorable election outcome.   However, the final 
result, whether favorable or unfavorable, will occur with or without A’s vote, unless the election 
is decided by one vote.  Let P be the probability of all the other voters besides A being equally 
divided, which is likely to be an extremely small number. The expected benefit for A of voting is 
then the product of the benefit of a favorable result times the probability of the vote being tied 
without A's vote.  On the cost side, individual A must consider the opportunity cost of voting, 
which may involve registering and/or waiting in line for several hours to cast a ballot.  Moreover, 
there is a significant cost to obtaining information about the candidates, especially given that 
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voters are generally uninformed to begin with.  In 2016, just 37 percent of registered voters could 
name either their U.S. Representative or Senator.  With that said, the total cost of voting is C, 
and therefore rationality dictates that individual A votes if and only if RP>C. 
In elections for political office candidates are usually driven to a centrist position so there 
is not likely to be a great deal of difference in the consequences for any voter of one candidate 
being elected rather than another. In other words, B probably will not be a large amount. Since P 
is likely to be a very small quantity the expected gain from voting is likely to be small.  
Therefore, low turnout is justified because voters are acting in their own rational interest.  As 
Economists point out, this constitutes a serious market failure, which is not easily remedied by 
regulation.  After all, regulation is not immune to the same problems because voters will be 
unable to distinguish a good regulation from a bad one, much as they often fail to distinguish a 
candidate who represents their economic interests. (Holcombe, 1989)36 
 Ultimately, the base strategy provides the only plausible remedy to the dilemma 
presented by Public Choice Theory.  If a progressive candidate is nominated by the Democratic 
Party and faces off against another base candidate in Donald Trump, the benefits of voting may 
overtake the costs, because the respective contenders’ ideology/policy preferences will diverge 
more than in a typical election.  As such, individual A would choose to vote, if he/she is a 
rational actor, because the potential difference in his/her daily life will outweigh the costs 
associated with participating in the political process.  While the election outcome will almost 
certainly be independent of individual A’s vote, the wide gulf between candidates will counter 
the structural biases against voting.  Given Sanders’ history as an elected official, there is little 
 
36 Holcombe, R. G. (1989). “The Median Voter Model in Public Choice Theory.” Public Choice 
61 (2): 115-125.  
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evidence to suggest he would follow the lead of his Democratic predecessors and pivot to the 
center; rather, he will likely focus on appeals to the progressive base, and in doing so generate 
increases in turnout.(Lenz, 2012)37 
 In addition to Public Choice Theory, behavioral game theory also serves as a useful tool 
of analysis.  As with the persuasion strategy, limited strategic thinking plays a significant role 
when turnout becomes the priority.  For instance, among progressive voters, particularly diehard 
Sanders supporters, many of whom did not vote in 2016, there may be an increased urgency to 
participate based on the preferences of other voters.  In a recent Gallup poll, nearly 70 percent of 
registered Republican voters reported enthusiasm about voting in the upcoming election, as did 
65 percent of registered Democrats.(Pew, 2019)38 With this in mind, supporters of Senator 
Sanders will be energized but also aware that their enthusiasm is replicated for the opposing 
candidate; as such, they will be more likely to vote to ensure that Sanders prevails.  In 2016, 
many Democratic voters underestimated support for Trump, and, when combined with Clinton’s 
high unfavorable numbers, contributed to a slight decline in turnout. 
Lastly, the base strategy can also be justified by applying an alternate interpretation of the 
Overton Window.  Whereas advocates of the persuasion strategy would contend that the window 
of plausible policies is relatively constrained, recent changes in the electorate suggest otherwise.  
As early as 1982, Economist Milton Friedman expressed his view that the spectrum of policies is 
not constant, nor should it be, over time:  “Our basic function is to develop alternatives to 
existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes 
 
37 Lenz, Gabriel. (2012). “Follow the Leader? How Voters Respond to Politicians’ Policies and 
Performance.” Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
38 “Political Independents: Who They Are, What They Think.” (2019). Pew Research Center.  
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politically inevitable.”(Ledyard, 1984)39  In this excerpt, Friedman implies that policymakers 
should not necessarily restrict themselves to advocating only for solutions within the mainstream 
at a given moment.  In 2020, there are indications that the Overton Window may be expanding to 
encompass progressive policies once dismissed as ‘fringe’ or ‘radical.’  In 2017, Sanders’ 
signature measure, the Medicare for All Act, had no Senate co-sponsors in 2013, but four years 
later it had 16, along with 125 in the House.  According to the Senator himself, “We have come a 
very, very long way in the American people now demanding legislation and concepts that just a 
few years ago were thought to be very radical.”  Among the current field of 2020 Democratic 
candidates, policies once thought to be outside the realm of the ‘politically possible’ are now 
widely accepted, including proposals like the Green New Deal and a minimum wage increase to 
$15/hour.  Progressive policies are not only gaining support from within the Democratic Party, 
but they are earning recognition from Republicans.  While the vast majority of conservative 
voters are opposed to single-payer healthcare and other policy alternatives, they seem to 
acknowledge the possibility that it could become law in the not too distant future. 
With that said, there are economists who argue that the above theory is nothing more than 
wishful thinking.  According to Loewenstein et. al, the more divided we become, the harder it is 
to locate the Overton Window, let alone move it...on the national level, there is no window. 
Instead of a consensus edging one way or another, we have a choice between two 
poles.”(Loewenstein, 2003)40  Moreover, “The Overton Window is ultimately a name for what 
 
39 Ledyard, John, O. (1984). “The Pure-Theory of Two-Candidate Elections.” Public Choice 
44(January): 7-41. 
40 Loewenstein, George, O’Donohue, Ted, Rabin, Matthew. (2003). “Projection Bias In 
Predicting Future Utility.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4): 1209-1248. 
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we have lost, not an indication of where we are headed.”  In other words, Loewenstein and like-
minded economists contend that a singular Overton Window cannot exist when the two major 
political parties have such divergent policy preferences.  Although this is a valid argument, it 
fails to account for the increasing consensus among voters, irrespective of party, for specific 
liberal policies, including an assault weapons ban, increased marginal taxes on the wealthy, and 
campaign finance reform. 
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Part Three 
A Third Way 
 
“I don’t think they’re picking on me because I’m a woman, I think they’re picking on me 
because I’m winning,”  At a news conference in November 2007, then-Senator Hillary Clinton 
made this statement in response to criticism that she was exploiting her gender for political gain.  
Similarly, Clinton’s chief rival in the 2008 campaign, then-Senator Barack Obama adopted a 
similar tone, maintaining that: “If I don’t win this race, it won’t be because of my background, it 
will be because I have not shown to the American people a vision for where the country needs to 
go.”  Although Clinton won a majority of white voters in the primary, Obama prevailed in the 
general election, and in doing so outperformed two of his white Democratic predecessors among 
both non-college and college-educated whites.  Following his reelection in 2012, albeit a tighter 
race, President Obama was deemed by many pundits and journalists to be a ‘post-racial’ 
candidate, who transcended identity.  According to David Axelrod, a Senior Advisor to the 
President, Obama viewed himself as ‘of’ the black community, but not ‘defined’ by it. (Morris, 
2019)41 
Just four years later, Secretary Clinton employed a radically different approach in her 
campaign for President.  Unlike 2008, the Clinton team chose to highlight issues of identity, 
namely gender and race, that had not featured prominently in past election cycles.  As a general 
rule, the campaign adopted a base approach with respect to identity, and Secretary Clinton 
herself frequently reminded voters of her place in history: “If you think fighting for equal pay 
 
41 Morris, Elliott, G. (2019). “Why a Left-Wing Nominee Would Hurt Democrats.” The 
Economist. 
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and paid family leave is playing the woman card, then deal me in!”(McElwee, 2020)42  
Conversely, on non-identity issues, such as climate change and gun control, the Clinton 
campaign prioritized persuasion over turnout, adopting a more moderate tone.  Despite efforts to 
corral base voters with appeals to identity and reassure moderate Republicans/Independents of 
her centrist positions on economics, Clinton failed to defeat an opponent with the worst 
favorability ratings of any Presidential candidate in history.  As Dr. Bitecofer points out, “under 
their[Clinton team’s] persuasion strategy Independents were not moved into the Democratic 
column and that liberal defection alone cost Hillary Clinton more than 1.5 million votes 
nationally as well as victories in the three Midwestern states that swung the Electoral College to 
Donald Trump.”(Bitecofer, 2018)43  Given the high concentration of non-college educated white 
voters in Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, many experts speculated that Clinton’s 
historic underperformance with this cohort ultimately cost her the election.  In 2008, the first 
African American Presidential nominee only lost by 15 points among this voting group; by 2016, 
the Republican Party with Trump at the helm enjoyed a 24-point advantage.(McElwee, 2018)44 
Although Clinton’s loss was the product of a complex interplay of factors, including foreign 
interference and personal missteps, evidence from the most prominent election surveys suggests 
that her focus on identity politics and Trump’s ability to counteract it effectively contributed 
most to her defeat.  Looking ahead to 2020, the optimal general election strategy for the eventual 
 
42 McElwee, Sean, Schaffner, Brian F. (2020). “How Democrats Can Win Back Obama-Trump 
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Democratic nominee will involve a reconciliation between turnout and persuasion and a 
significant shift away from issues of identity. 
Chapter One 
3.1 Political Analysis 
 According to the preeminent political science journal Political Science Quarterly, 
identity politics can be defined as: “a political approach and analysis based on people prioritizing 
the concerns most relevant to their particular racial, religious, ethnic, sexual, social, cultural or 
other identity, and forming exclusive political alliances with others of this group, instead of 
engaging in more traditional, broad-based party politics.”(Collingwood, 2018)45  What’s more, 
identity is used as a tool to frame political claims, promote political ideologies, or stimulate and 
orient social and political action, usually in a larger context of inequality or injustice to assert 
group distinctiveness.   
In many ways, the 2016 Presidential election was a referendum on race, gender, and 
immigration.  Throughout the campaign, then-candidate Trump unabashedly exploited white 
identity politics by promoting the birther conspiracy, taking a hardline stance on immigration, 
and adopting slogans, i.e. ‘America First,’ with a racially charged history.  In doing so, Trump 
operationalized voters’ implicit prejudices and linked economic woes to demographic change. 
Although a majority of journalists and pundits identified economic anxiety as the primary driver 
of Trump’s upset victory, data from the American National Election and VOTER surveys 
suggests that the impact of economics was dwarfed by that of identity. As displayed below in 
 
45 Collingwood, L., Reny, T. T., Valenzuela, A. (2018). “Vote Switching in the 2016 Election: 
How Racial and Immigration Attitudes, Not Economics, Explain Shifts in White Voting.” 
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figure 5(where the x axis represents vote share for the Republican candidate), Trump 
outperformed Romney among voters who attribute racial inequality to lack of effort, independent 
of economic anxiety (Sides, 2018)46: 
Figure 5 
 
  
 
 
 
According to Sides et.al, author of the book Identity Crisis, the Trump campaign’s focus 
on identity-inflected issues, combined with Clinton and Trump’s sharply divergent positions on 
race and immigration heightened the salience of white identity.  Once activated, racialized 
economics, defined as “the belief that undeserving groups are getting ahead while your group is 
left behind,” took hold.  Therefore, voters’ attitudes on racial issues accounted for the 
unprecedented divide between college and non-college educated white voters.  Unlike in 2008 
and 2012, many white voters who had been traditionally associated with the Democratic Party 
switched allegiances in 2016 as identity politics took center stage.  As Sides et.al point out, 
polling indicates that significant proportions of white Obama voters aligned more with Trump on 
issues of race and immigration: “49 percent of this cohort did not think that ‘blacks have gotten 
 
46 Sides, John, Tesler, Michael, Vavrek, Lynn. (2018). Identity Crisis. London: Princeton 
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less than they deserve,’ 39 percent did not believe that slavery and discrimination hindered the 
economic advancement of blacks, and 28 percent blamed the economic disadvantages of blacks 
on their own effort.”(Sides, 2018)47  Further findings from the 2016 ANES and VOTER surveys 
also document the potency of Trump’s identity-based strategy/platform, as illustrated below. 
Once again, there is a notable association between support for Trump and voters’ 
attitudes on issues of identity, while no such relationship is observed for Trump support and 
economic anxiety as a separate variable.   Above all else, data from 2016 should serve as a 
warning to Democratic Presidential candidates who intend to follow Clinton’s lead and embrace 
a liberal version of identity politics.  So long as President Trump remains the chief opponent in 
2020, Democrats risk alienating non-college educated white voters who are highly concentrated 
in critical battleground states. 
 
47 Sides, John, Tesler, Michael, Vavrek, Lynn. (2018). Identity Crisis. London: Princeton 
University Press: 163-165. 
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Instead, the eventual Democratic nominee should employ a bifurcated 
messaging/campaign strategy, wherein he/she adopts the base strategy on issues most salient to 
the Democratic base, while adopting the persuasion strategy on issues most salient to undecided 
voters.  Specifically, the nominee should embrace a progressive platform with respect to climate 
change, health care, tax reform, and gun control, issues that are disproportionately more 
important to Democratic base voters.  Conversely, the Democratic candidate should prioritize 
persuasion with respect to race/gender, immigration, and national security, issues that are 
disproportionately more important to undecided and moderate Republican voters.  The gulf in 
salience for each of these issues is illustrated in figure 8 below: 
Figure 7 
           If the Democratic nominee intends to maximize 
his/her chances to unseat the incumbent President, 
he/she must appeal to both Obama-nonvoters, who 
largely represent the progressive wing of the party and 
Obama-Trump-Democratic voters(Obama-Trump 
voters who supported Democratic candidates in the 
2018 midterms), who comprise 25 percent(~1.8 
million) of all Obama-Trump voters.(McElwee, 2018)48  
According to the Cooperative Congressional Election 
Survey, the results of which are displayed in figure 9, Obama-Trump-Democratic voters hold 
positions consistent with Democratic base voters(those who supported both Obama and Clinton) 
on gun control and climate change, but far more moderate or even right-wing positions on 
 
48 McElwee, Sean. (2018). “How Democrats Can Mobilize Millions of Non-Voters.” The Nation.  
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identity-based issues such as immigration.  Even among Obama-nonvoters, there is a wide 
discrepancy in support for progressive policies between non-identity and identity issues.   For 
instance, an overwhelming majority, 85 percent of both Obama-nonvoters and Obama-Trump-
Democratic voters support Medicare-for-All, while just 45 percent of Obama-Trump-Democratic 
voters agree that ‘whites have advantages’ or that ‘feminists are making reasonable demands.’  
Overall, with respect to key identity issues, Obama-Trump-Democratic voters diverge 
dramatically from Obama-nonvoters and Democratic base voters, and are in fact more closely 
aligned with Republican base voters.  As political scientist Brian Schaffner points out: “The 
story of Democratic success in winning back the House in 2018 seems to be driven by... the 
ability to win back some cross-pressured members of the Obama coalition who voted for Trump 
in 2016, while also remobilizing former Obama voters...progressive economic and climate views 
unite these two coalitions, while the groups are more divided when it comes to racial justice and  
gender equity.”(Schaffner, 2020)49  
 
49 Schaffner, Brian F. (2018). “Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: 
The Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism.” Political Science Quarterly. 
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 In a landmark study entitled “The 100 Million Project,” researchers at the John S. and 
James L. Knight Foundation surveyed a representative sample of 12,000 ‘chronic nonvoters’ or 
eligible, but unregistered voters, or people who have voted only once in the past six elections.  
According to the survey, 100 million Americans, or 43 percent of eligible voters, fit this 
description.  It found that non-voters are less educated, poorer, and more likely to be minorities, 
single and women. 62 percent do not have a college degree, and 20 to 25 percent make less than 
$50,000 annually; 65 percent are white.  A majority, 51 percent, have a negative opinion of 
Trump, versus 40 percent positive. While non-voters skew center-left on some key issues like 
health care, they are slightly more conservative than the general population on immigration and 
racial issues.  This cohort, which comprises a key component of Senator Sanders’ election 
strategy, is open to 
progressive policies 
such as Medicare-for-
All, which receives 60 
percent support, but is 
in opposition to 
Sanders’ pledge to 
decriminalize border 
crossings. (Amandi, 
2020)50  
 
50 Amandi, Fernand, et. al. (2020). “The-100-Million Project: The Untold Story of American 
Non-voters.” Bendixen & Amandi International (February). 
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Given that members of the Democratic base, undecided voters, and nonvoters are all 
more conservative on issues of identity, it follows that the 2020 Democratic nominee should 
adopt a persuasion strategy on such issues to maximize support.   Based on polling data, the ideal 
candidate would adopt Obama’s 2012 immigration policy platform, which includes a pathway to 
citizenship, protection for DACA recipients, increased border security, and criminalization of 
border crossings.  More importantly, the candidate should, as much as possible, attempt to lower 
the salience of identity issues and pivot to discuss progressive policies on climate change and 
taxes, which have broad appeal.  Both Obama-nonvoter-Democrats (92 percent) and Obama-
Trump-Democrats (88 percent) support a $12 minimum wage and a millionaire’s tax (92 percent 
and 79 percent).” (McElwee, 2020)51 
Given these competing findings, both base and persuasion strategies can be employed in 
different contexts with respect to different policies.  As it relates to base mobilization, the 
Democratic nominee should embrace Medicare-for-All, increased income taxes on the top 1 
percent, a wealth tax, a gun registry, a ban on assault weapons, and the Green New Deal.  As it 
relates to persuasion, the nominee should restrict messaging on immigration and minority 
discrimination, while supporting widely popular policies such as the continuation of protections 
for DACA recipients.  This component of the strategy emphasizes messaging over policy.  On 
national security, the Democratic candidate should adopt a pacifist-realist approach, whereby 
he/she pledges to prioritize diplomacy over military action and takes a firm stance against regime 
change.   While no one candidate in the current 2020 field is perfectly positioned on all of the 
above issues, Senator Sanders and Vice President Joe Biden come closest to an ideal choice. As 
 
51 McElwee, Sean, Schaffner, Brian F. (2020). “How Democrats Can Win Back Obama-Trump 
Defectors.” The New York Times.  
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displayed in the figure 9 below, the two leading candidates in the Democratic primary are rated 
on a -1.0 to 1.0 scale by issue, with 1.0 representing the most progressive stance possible, and -
1.0 denoting President Trump’s position.  ‘Median Battleground’ voters represent the average 
position for the key voting blocs identified for both the base and persuasion strategies in the 
swing states, including: Obama-Trump, Obama-Protest, Obama-nonvoters, Romney-Clinton, 
Romney-Protest.*  These ratings were calculated using data from the Kaiser/Pew Research 
survey conducted in October 2019 and a comprehensive study of battleground voters completed 
by the polling company Engagious.* (Thau, 2020)52                                          
Figure 9 
Issue Biden Sanders Warren Median 
Battleground 
Target/Ideal 
Candidate 
Health Care 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.7 
Economy 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.7 
Climate 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.8 
Guns 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.8 
Immigration 0.5 0.8 1.0 -0.3 0.2 
Race/Gender 0.4 0.7 0.9 -0.3 0.2 
National 
Security 
0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 
 
 
*Using data compiled from the joint KFF/Cook political survey, ANES, and the Catalist Voter Registration 
Database, voter views on the above issues were calculated and matched to the scale described above.  The ‘ideal’ or 
‘target’ value for the 2020 Democratic Presidential nominee represents the average voter rating, when applied to the 
scale, of the median battleground voter, or any voter falling into the ‘swing’ or ‘base’ categories described in Parts 1 
and 2. 
52 Thau, Richard. (2019). “Election 2020 Voter Perceptions.” Engagious. 
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 As illustrated above, Sanders’ positions, with the exception of gun control and 
immigration, are closely aligned with preferences for key battleground state voting cohorts.  Vice 
President Biden is also a strong candidate given his comparatively moderate position on 
immigration.  What’s more, Biden has staked his candidacy on electability and has demonstrated 
strength among groups in the persuasion category, i.e. Obama-Trump and Romney-Clinton 
voters.  On the flip side, Sanders has demonstrated support from base voter cohorts, especially 
Obama-nonvoters and Obama-Protest voters, who tend to hold more progressive positions even 
than the average Democratic Party voter.  Senator Warren, on the other hand, has made identity 
politics a centerpiece of her campaign, constantly reminding voters that she would decriminalize 
border crossings if elected President.  Although this policy is supported by nearly 50 percent of 
Democratic primary voters, it is wildly unpopular in battleground states.  Senator Warren’s 
economic policies, on the other hand, which include a wealth tax for individuals with assets over 
$50 million, do have broad appeal, but ultimately the controversial policies on immigration 
offset this potential benefit. As such, adopting a progressive position on immigration may be 
counterproductive, as it may disproportionately harm the Democratic nominee in the Rust Belt, 
where working-class whites are heavily concentrated.  
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Chapter Two                                                                                            
3.2 Economic Analysis   
Despite the apparent disconnect between economic theories in support and in opposition 
of the persuasion strategy, there is significant overlap.  For one, while the Median Voter 
Theorem is often applied universally to campaigns, it can be modified to apply in limited 
circumstances, with respect to specific issues.  Furthermore, Public Choice Theory may also be 
relevant given that both major parties continue to diverge on policy, which may increase the 
weight of an individual vote.  Finally, the Overton Window may be wider on issues of economics 
and healthcare but narrower on culturally sensitive issues, i.e. immigration. 
As mentioned earlier, the Median Voter Theorem presupposes agreement on the central 
issues dividing an electorate.   According to the data presented in part three of this analysis, the 
nature and extent of polarization on key issues is relatively well understood in 2020.  As such, 
the eventual Democratic nominee can confidently appeal to the median voter on immigration, an 
issue with low salience to the base and higher salience for undecided and right-leaning voters.  
Doing so will maximize support among the majority of voters who support DACA and enhanced 
border security, while minimizing lost base votes.  Given that President Trump has largely 
written off the persuasion strategy on virtually all issues, the Democratic nominee is poised to 
exploit this vulnerability. 
The ‘third way’ strategy can also draw support from Public Choice Theory.  Although a 
candidate adopting moderate positions on identity may not constitute a radical departure from the 
current Administration, progressive economic/healthcare policies would offset this effect. As 
such, a Democratic nominee would still be able to draw a sharp contrast with the incumbent 
while employing the bifurcated campaign strategy, thus presenting a clear choice for the voter.  
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Once the distinction between general election candidates becomes apparent, the individual voter 
will be incentivized to turn out. (Fedderson, 2004)53 
With respect to the Overton Window, data from previous sections demonstrates that 
policies outside of the ‘mainstream’ are palatable on most issues.  For instance, the percentage of 
registered voters in favor of increased taxes on the wealthy has steadily climbed from a low of 40 
percent in 2000 to nearly 70 percent in 2019. (Alesina, 2017)54  Conversely, the Overton 
Window has remained narrow on identity issues, as a majority of white voters insist that whites 
face more ‘discrimination’ than racial minorities in the United States.  Given these competing 
findings, it would appear that the Overton Window is fluid except with respect to identity issues. 
Therefore, in order to maximize chances of victory, the Democratic nominee can comfortably 
advocate for more ‘radical’ or forward-thinking policies with respect to economics and the 
environment without the risk of significant backlash.  According to David French of The 
National Review, there is recent precedent for expanding the Overton Window’s traditional 
confines: “...along came Donald Trump. On key issues, he didn’t just move the Overton 
Window, he smashed it, scattered the shards, and rolled over them with a steamroller. On issues 
like immigration, national security, and even the manner of political debate itself, there’s no 
window left.”(French, 2017)55  As French points out, the current Republican President is 
evidence himself that the window of policies deemed ‘mainstream’ or acceptable to the average 
voter can shift dramatically, even within the course of one election cycle. 
 
53 Feddersen, Timothy, J. (2004). “Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives (Winter) 18(1); 99-112. 
54 Alesina, Alberto,  Passarelli, Francesco. (2017). “Loss Aversion in Politics.” Harvard 
University Press (February). 
55 French, David.  (2017). “Expanding the Overton Window.” National Review. (January). 
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Finally, as it relates to limited strategic thinking, the proposed strategy is most likely to 
align with voters’ beliefs about other voters.  As a litany of polls demonstrate, Democratic voters 
generally believe that electability is driven by identity politics.  According to a 2019 survey 
conducted by YouGov, “60 percent of Democrats believe a candidate being white makes a 
difference. Similarly, 34 percent of Dems think that being nonwhite does not make a difference, 
with 23 percent unsure.” (Ghitza, 2019)56 
As the results of the poll demonstrate, Democrats are concerned about the identity of the 
candidate.  A majority believe that other voters will be prejudiced, and therefore they may be 
more likely to vote for candidates like Vice President Biden, because they believe other voters 
will be more likely to reject a female or minority candidate.  In June of last year, Gallup 
conducted a poll of likely, registered voters and found that less than 75 percent would consider 
supporting an LGBTQ candidate, and just 65 percent would support a candidate who identified 
as Muslim.  Given the presence of the Bradley Effect, whereby voters often purport to be more 
socially accepting in opinion polls than they are in practice, these poll results are even more 
alarming.  Above all else, they reveal that systematic prejudices remain widespread, and as such 
other voters take these biases into consideration when making their own decision.  Because the 
data suggest not only systematic biases towards nonwhite or female candidates but awareness 
among comparatively unbiased voters, limited strategic thinking will further decrease the 
likelihood of electing a female or minority candidate, especially one that relies on identity 
politics.  When the salience of identity issues increases, such candidates will face even greater 
electoral obstacles. 
 
 
56 Ghitza, Y. (2019). “Analyzing the Catalist Voter Registration Database.” Medium (March). 
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Part Four 
Normative Implications & Conclusion 
 Regardless of the election outcome, there will be significant ramifications for each of the 
campaign strategies discussed in this analysis.  On the one hand, if Senator Sanders emerges as 
the Democratic nominee and goes on to defeat President Trump, the turnout strategy may 
become more popular going forward.  Such a victory would be the first of its kind on a national 
scale, and for the first time, political scientists and future campaigns would have a relevant 
precedent to study.  Normatively, however, such an outcome may be undesirable because it will 
demonstrate that both major political parties are capable of electoral success at the expense of the 
median voter.  In future campaigns, candidates seeking to employ the base strategy can do so 
with greater confidence, all while speaking to their own voters, rather than the electorate at large.   
Given that U.S. political institutions are designed to promote cross-cutting coalitions and 
nonpartisanship, employing the base strategy may compound the recent trend of increasing 
political gridlock.  As evidenced by the debt ceiling debacle of 2011, the ‘fiscal cliff’ of 2012, 
and the countless instances of Congressional dysfunction, polarization has paralyzed democratic 
system.  The founders envisioned a system of constantly shifting factions/coalitions; partisanship 
and tribalism short-circuits this model.  David French of the National Review, one of the 
country’s most prominent conservative publications, highlights the dangers of pursuing base 
politics:  “The shattering of the Overton Window reflects the shattering of the American 
consensus, and the result will likely be deeper polarization, and even less civility, with further 
strains on the ties that bind our nation together.”(French, 2017)57    Although Senator Sanders’ 
platform and brand of politics is a far cry from those of the incumbent President, his insistence 
 
57 French, David.  (2017). “Expanding the Overton Window.” National Review. (January): 4. 
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on unrealistic policies, most of which are only popular among the progressive base, may 
exacerbate the political fissures in the body politic. 
 On the other hand, if former Vice President Biden rides a wave of anti-Trump sentiment 
to the White House, the normative implications of his victory may not be much more 
encouraging.  If Biden decides to prioritize persuasion writ large, and pivots on several key 
issues, such as climate change in the general election, he will continue to normalize the politics 
of insincerity.  Consistently, in poll after poll, across time, race and gender, the single most 
unpopular and discouraging trait identified by voters in politicians is their seemingly constant 
attempts to flip the script.  As such, candidates are better served balancing base turnout with 
persuasion on an issue-by-issue basis.  In the upcoming election, it is abundantly clear that, 
especially in critical states in the Industrial Midwest, issues of race and immigration do not play 
in the Democrats’ favor.  Conversely, on an issue like climate change, considered the second-
most important issue among Democratic voters and the thirteenth-most important issue among 
Republicans, the nominee can feel free to ‘swing for the fences’  Balancing persuasion with 
turnout will not only be beneficial politically, but normatively, as it provides an opportunity for a 
nuanced, sophisticated approach.  In an era of zero-sum, all-or-nothing, binary politics, adopting 
the ‘third way’ strategy will be a step towards progress and away from partisanship.   
 Although the final results of the Democratic Presidential Primary will be unknown for 
several months, the strategy employed by the Biden team is somewhat encouraging from a 
normative perspective.  Following the March 10th primaries, when Vice President Biden assumed 
an all but insurmountable lead, his campaign began to modulate his platform in order to offer an 
olive branch to the progressive base.  Although the changes, which include a pledge to lower the 
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Medicare eligibility age to 60, they are an indication that the Biden campaign intends to avoid 
the pitfalls of ignoring base voter preferences on highly salient issues. 
 With that said, numerous obstacles are impeding the implementation of such a campaign 
strategy, including the current state of the U.S. electoral system.  As it currently stands, the 
electoral college rewards candidates who exclusively focus on the swing states and renders 
members of the minority party in each state irrelevant.  After all, since it is possible to win a 
Presidential election with a mere plurality in every state, candidates are not incentivized to 
appeal to Republicans in California or Democrats in North Dakota.  Rather, the system rewards 
uniform, highly rigid, staunchly partisan campaign platforms and candidates, to the detriment of 
the voters and the democratic process.  Edward Foley, Professor of Law at Ohio State University, 
discusses the disconnect between the founders’ vision of the Presidential election process and the 
current reality: “The Jeffersonians…argued strenuously that, according to fundamental principles 
of republican government, the chief executive must be the choice of the majority party. Senator 
John Taylor, a constitutional scholar…asserted that it ‘never’ is appropriate that ‘a minor faction 
should acquire a power capable of defeating the majority in the election of President.’(Foley, 
2019)58  The 12th Amendment that he and the Jeffersonians proposed—in which electors each 
cast a single vote for president and then a separate vote for vice president—was designed to 
entrust power to the majority vote.  In Foley’s view, the “Jeffersonians would find [the current 
system] entirely objectionable insofar as it empowers a party and a candidate that lack a majority 
 
58 Foley, Edward B. (2019). Presidential Elections and Majority Rule. Oxford University Press:     
64-66. 
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of votes…even more objectionable if such a candidate achieved an Electoral College victory 
only as a result of these minority-vote wins in enough states.” (Foley, 2019)59 
 In order to allow for more flexible policies and increase the diversity of campaign 
strategies, the electoral college must be reformed such that candidates are required to attain a 
majority.  One possible solution involves rank-choice-runoff voting, whereby each voter ranks 
his/her preferred candidates in order of preference and, when results are tabulated, the top two 
candidates advance to a runoff to determine the winner.  In 2016, then-candidate Trump won 7 
swing states with less than 50 percent of the vote with a margin of victory under 3 percentage 
points.  Sixteen years earlier, the election was decided by a margin of 0.05% in Florida. In his 
book published last December, Foley endorses the proposal to alter the means of electoral 
allocation: “There are many methods states can use to comply with this principle[of majority 
rule]…states could adopt the kind of ‘instant runoff voting’ procedure…Voters can rank their 
preferences among multiple candidates, so that a computer can tally which of the top two 
finalists receives a majority once all lower-ranked candidates are eliminated.”(Foley, 2019)60   
If rank-choice voting were applied nationally, a Presidential candidate would no longer 
be able to win outright without receiving at least 50 percent of the vote in the final stage.  These 
reforms, unlike the proposed elimination of the electoral college, are more likely to achieve 
bipartisan appeal and make progress towards a system that affirms the principle of ‘one voice, 
one vote.’  In the end, this system would enable the employment of the third way strategy, which 
 
59 Foley, Edward B. (2019). Presidential Elections and Majority Rule. Oxford University Press: 
41. 
60 Foley, Edward B. (2019). Presidential Elections and Majority Rule. Oxford University Press: 
42. 
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respects the views of voters from different backgrounds, political persuasions, and values, while 
retaining the core message of the Presidential candidate.   
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